Good faith and collective decision-making: Saxon Woods v Costa [2026] UKSC 21 and its significance for BVI corporate disputes
In Saxon Woods Investments Ltd and others v Francesco Costa [2026] UKSC 21, the UK Supreme Court unanimously dismissed a director’s appeal and clarified that the duty of good faith under section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 is not confined to a director’s honest belief as to what will promote the company’s success. The appeal considered whether respect for directors’ business judgment permits a dissenting director to implement a contrary strategy that undermines a decision of the board as a whole. The Supreme Court answered that question emphatically in the negative. Accordingly, the court held that a director who covertly subverts a board approved strategy may breach the duty of good faith notwithstanding a genuine and honestly held belief that the alternative course would better promote the company’s success.
Background and facts
Spring Media Investments Ltd (“the Company”) was the holding company of a creative services group. Saxon Woods held a minority shareholding in the Company. Under a shareholders’ agreement, the Company and its investors agreed to work in good faith towards a sale of the Company by the end of 2019. At the material time, Mr Costa was both a director and chairman of the Company.
The board delegated responsibility for the sale process to Mr Costa. However, he believed that postponing any sale beyond 2019 would generate a greater return for the Company and its investors. Acting on that belief, he pursued a strategy that diverged from the course approved by the board and contemplated by the shareholders’ agreement. In doing so, he delayed the sale process, withheld information from fellow directors and shareholders, and misled the board into believing that the Company was complying with its obligations under the shareholders’ agreement when, to his knowledge, it was not.
Mr Costa succeeded in delaying any sale beyond 2019. The anticipated exit was subsequently overtaken by the Covid-19 pandemic, which severely affected the Company’s business and destroyed the prospect of a beneficial sale. Saxon Woods therefore brought an unfair prejudice petition, alleging that Mr Costa was responsible for frustrating the agreed exit strategy and seeking an order requiring him to purchase its shares at the value they would have had if an exit was achieved in 2019.
The essence of Mr Costa’s defence was that, provided a director genuinely believes that a particular course of action is most likely to promote the company’s success, the manner in which that objective is pursued is a matter for the director alone. In other words, even if the director conceals information from colleagues or misleads them in furtherance of that objective, there can be no breach of section 172 so long as the underlying belief is honestly held.
The decisions in the courts below
At first instance, the trial judge held that Mr Costa genuinely believed he was acting in the best interests of the Company and its investors. Applying the subjective approach in Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80, the judge concluded that Mr Costa had neither acted dishonestly nor breached his duty under section 172 of the UKCA 2006.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Costa’s appeal and reached a different conclusion on section 172. Applying the objective test of dishonesty in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, it held that Mr Costa’s deception of the board was dishonest and therefore inconsistent with good faith. The court further held that it was not open to Mr Costa unilaterally to pursue a different strategy for the Company’s success from that embodied in the shareholders’ agreement. The Court of Appeal accordingly replaced the conditional order with an immediate, unconditional buy-out of Saxon Woods’ shares at their pro rata, undiscounted value as at 31 December 2019.
The Supreme Court’s decision
The Supreme Court dismissed Mr Costa’s appeal and rejected his argument that section 172 imposes a purely subjective test. While endorsing the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, it held that the duty of good faith extends beyond a director’s belief as to the company’s best interests to the manner in which that belief is implemented. The court accepted that directors’ business judgments will generally be respected if genuinely held. To that extent, the test remains subjective. However, as Lord Briggs observed, a director does not obtain “carte blanche” to pursue a dissenting view through covert or disloyal means. A court may therefore objectively assess whether the director’s conduct is consistent with fiduciary loyalty. The Supreme Court’s reasoning rested on three principal considerations:
Consistency with the common law understanding of directors' duties: the deference accorded to business judgment operated consistently with the ability of the court to objectively assess fiduciary conduct in determining whether a fiduciary's duty has been breached.
Consistency with the statutory context: section 172 forms part of a scheme of directors’ duties intended to operate consistently with the company’s constitutional governance. Good faith therefore governs conduct as well as decision-making.
Avoiding an unworkable result: confining good faith to a director’s thought processes would undermine collective decision-making and promote dysfunction in corporate governance.
The Supreme Court therefore agreed that Mr Costa had breached section 172. His conduct was “manifestly disloyal” and amounted to bad faith, notwithstanding his genuine belief that delaying the sale was in the Company’s interests. The key departure from the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was that dishonesty was not the decisive test but merely one factor within the broader inquiry into whether a director has acted in good faith.
The significance of the decision to BVI corporate disputes
The decision is likely to be highly persuasive in the BVI. In ZKI Dekel v Clerkenwell Lifestyle Ltd (BVIHCM2024/0466, 4 March 2025), Mithani J observed that section 120(1) of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004 is “similar to s. 172 of the Companies Act 2006 of Great Britain, though s. 172 is more elaborately formulated than s. 120(1) of the BCA 2004”. Notwithstanding the more detailed drafting of section 172, both provisions are founded upon the same core fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the relationship between subjective belief, good faith and fiduciary loyalty is likely to provide persuasive guidance to BVI courts when interpreting and applying section 120(1).
The decision is particularly relevant to claims under section 184I of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004. A member may seek relief where the affairs of a company are conducted in a manner that is oppressive, unfairly discriminatory or unfairly prejudicial to its interests. In that context, the covert frustration of a board-approved strategy, particularly one that flouts agreed shareholder expectations, may be relevant both as a breach of fiduciary duty and as conduct supporting an unfair prejudice claim.
The decision also has practical significance for closely held companies and joint ventures, which feature prominently in BVI corporate disputes. In such structures, decision-making authority is often concentrated in a founder, chair, investment manager or nominee director. Saxon Woods reinforces that delegation of responsibility for a transaction or strategy does not transfer the board's ultimate constitutional responsibility for managing the company's affairs. A director entrusted with operational control cannot treat that mandate as authority to withhold information, exclude fellow directors from decision-making, or pursue an incompatible strategy behind the board's back.
More broadly, the decision strikes an important balance between respect for directors' business judgment and the need to preserve the integrity of the company's governance processes. Where disagreement arises over a board approved decision or strategy, objections should be raised openly through the company's governance structures rather than pursued through conduct that objectively evinces disloyalty or bad faith. In that respect, Saxon Woods is likely to be of particular relevance in BVI unfair prejudice and fiduciary duty disputes where a director's personal assessment of the company's interests diverges from the course of action approved by the board or agreed by shareholders collectively.
Frequently asked questions
常见问题解答
1. What was the main issue in Saxon Woods v Costa?
The case considered whether a director who genuinely believes an alternative strategy would better promote a company's success can nevertheless breach their duty of good faith by undermining a board-approved strategy through covert or disloyal conduct.
2. What did the UK Supreme Court decide?
The Supreme Court held that the duty of good faith under section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 is not limited to a director's honest belief about what is in the company's best interests. The court found that good faith also extends to the manner in which a director implements that belief.
3. Why was Mr Costa found to have breached his duties?
Mr Costa delayed the sale process, withheld information from fellow directors and shareholders, and misled the board about compliance with the shareholders' agreement. The Supreme Court held that this conduct was "manifestly disloyal" and amounted to bad faith, despite his genuine belief that delaying the sale was in the company's interests.
4. What significance does the decision have for BVI corporate disputes?
The judgment is likely to be highly persuasive in the BVI because section 120(1) of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004 is founded on similar principles of good faith and fiduciary loyalty. The decision may therefore assist BVI courts when interpreting directors' duties.
5. How could Saxon Woods affect unfair prejudice claims in the BVI?
The decision may be relevant to claims under section 184I of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004, particularly where a director covertly frustrates a board-approved strategy or shareholder expectations. Such conduct may be relevant both as a breach of fiduciary duty and as evidence supporting an unfair prejudice claim.